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Abstract  
This thesis paper is an analysis of the crisis communication response to the 2011 Pennsylvania 
State University child sex abuse scandal. The reputation of this iconic university and its football 
program was changed forever by this horrific event, which involved years of administrative 
cover-ups of the sexual assault of children by an assistant football coach. However, despite 
widespread public backlash, administrative upheaval and heavy NCAA sanctions in the months 
after the scandal broke, Penn State has since made major strides in image improvement.  
 
This project delves into what defines best crisis communication practices, using Penn State as a 
case study. While much of what the university did falls into the “what not to do” category, there 
is a lot to be learned from its actions. The purpose of this thesis is to look at what went right, 
what went wrong, and why, taking a deeper look at a large-scale public relations crisis in the 
context of the complex world of college athletics. 
 
My research begins with a literature review of best practices for dealing with crises in terms of 
communications.  Background research of the institution and the scandal itself through news 
coverage and various literature, including a biography on legendary PSU coach Joe Paterno, 
provided the foundation for a situation analysis. Strengths, weaknesses, opportunities and threats 
of the crisis situation were then laid out. Next came a communications audit of the way Penn 
State responded in the midst of a highly publicized scandal and an analysis of the administrative 
response to the situation, from firing and hiring to how the current (at the time) football team 
dealt with the situation. The final phase of research involved creating an evaluation of Penn 
State’s actions, along with recommendations for practitioners addressing college football crises 
in the future.  
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Executive Summary  
This study aims to explore and analyze Penn State’s crisis response after the shocking 
Jerry Sandusky scandal and cover-up came to light in 2011 and 2012.  In November 2011, 
former PSU football defensive coordinator Jerry Sandusky was arrested and later charged with 
45 counts related to the sexual abuse of young boys over an extensive period from 1994-2009. 
Much of the abuse allegedly took place in State College, PA at the football facility on Penn 
State’s campus. A grand jury investigation and later independent investigation headed by former 
FBI director Louis Freeh showed the involvement of PSU president Graham Spanier, athletic 
director Tim Curley, administrator Gary Schultz and revered longtime head football coach Joe 
Paterno in covering up Sandusky’s actions and failing to properly report him to the authorities. 
This scandal rocked a “big-time” college football program and well-known, widely respected 
university to its core, resulting in major media scrutiny and lost public trust. Despite this, just 
three years later, Penn State has bounced back due to a number of factors, including its loyal fan 
base, savvy administrative personnel and policy changes, and perhaps certain reactionary 
avenues it explored in responding to crisis.  
To examine this crisis in full, this thesis begins with a review of crisis communication 
best practices and suggested tactics before delving into Penn State as a case study. Then, context 
and background to inform the reader on the notoriously rampant culture of Penn State Football, 
along with an explanation of the details of the scandal, is provided. Armed with this knowledge, 
the reader then delves into an analysis of how Penn State reacted as an institution, through a 
communications audit and study of its efforts. Finally, these efforts are crosschecked with best 
practices in crisis communications, in order to see where Penn State went wrong and how they 
still overcame a crisis of this magnitude despite some early missteps. The thesis ends with 
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suggested recommendations for future college football crises based on the lessons learned from 
Penn State and the incorporation of best practice methods.  
Crisis management is a reactionary art that benefits strongly from proactive planning and 
scanning. While traditional public relations involves seeking publicity to garner brand 
recognition, build trust and create a positive image, crisis communications involves the crafting 
of targeted messages to respond to a problem in the public eye with the ultimate goal of 
alleviating public turmoil and rebuilding public trust (Bernstein & Bonafede, 2011, ch. 1). 
Experts suggest exercising such principles as honesty, compassion and confidence in crafting a 
crisis response – especially one where there are angry or hurt publics, as was the case with Penn 
State. Key elements of crisis response include choosing the right spokesperson, remaining 
transparent on all platforms – including social media, making frequent updates and disseminating 
consistent messages that align the organization with its core values in order to repair its 
relationship with its publics.  
Penn State football is one of the most popular programs in the country, and Joe Paterno 
reigned as “king” on Penn State’s campus as head football coach for 45 years, becoming the 
winningest coach in college football (though due to his role in this scandal over 100 wins were 
later vacated). PSU football has been called the “central fact of life in the state” due to its 
prevalence in the hearts and minds of so many Nittany Lion faithful (Vecsey, 2011). While this 
environment of “football as king” set the stage for an unprecedented crisis due to a series of 
serious administrative missteps and lack of ethical decision-making by those in power – in 
essence, placing football over everything proved to be detrimental – it also provided Penn State 
with massive potential for trust rebuilding and support in the post-crisis phase. The school did a 
poor job of realizing this potential from the start, and a lackadaisical initial crisis response put 
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the program and school in an even worse position than it found itself when the crisis broke. Still, 
three years later, Penn State has made considerable progress as an institution and Penn State 
football has moved forward as a sports entity despite the major bruises it endured from this 
scandal.  
Then-president Graham Spanier and legendary head football coach Joe Paterno – two of 
the most powerful people at Penn State – were wrapped up in the scandal, making crisis response 
even more difficult for Penn State than if Sandusky had been the sole cause of the problem. The 
stale taste of such an abominable cover-up was worsened with Penn State’s slow response, and 
Spanier’s initial statement addressing the crisis misplaced trust in the very administrators who 
were later charged with perjury for their roles in the scandal. Four days later, once the board of 
trustees made the decision to oust these top administrators including Spanier, Curley, Schultz 
and Paterno, Penn State began to make better crisis management decisions. The damage done 
seemed irreparable, but policy changes and a continued commitment to addressing the crisis – 
especially through hiring Louis Freeh, former FBI director, to carry out an independent 
investigation – showed good management decisions that were swiftly communicated to the 
public.  
Though it was punished severely by the NCAA with multiple sanctions and fines, Penn 
State stuck together as a football program and made a move forward into a new era after 
Paterno’s firing and death with the hire of head coach Bill O’Brien. Today, Penn State is led by a 
new chapter of leaders, once removed from the post-scandal era. Though this scandal will never 
be forgotten, Penn State was able to survive an unprecedented crisis by turning its act around and 
eventually distancing itself from those who brought it down. Painful memories and distrust in the 
minds of many will endure for a long time, but Penn State has clearly made progress in a 
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relatively short time – three years – that shows how a big-time college football program is able to 
move forward from a major black eye thanks to immense brand loyalty and targeted moves.  
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Preface  
As a public relations major with a strong interest in sport management and 
administration, I was fascinated by the way Penn State handled the unprecedented public 
relations disaster that resulted from allegations of a university cover-up of ongoing child sexual 
abuse by assistant football coach Jerry Sandusky. I am a voracious college football fan, and to 
see the arguably one of the most legendary programs of all time be at the head of such a horrific 
turn of events, shaking the complex world of college athletics to its core, was something that led 
me to examine the situation further, specifically from the perspective of the public relations crisis 
at hand. How would the university, and specifically, its historic football program, bounce back 
from such a disastrous image-destroying predicament with far-reaching legal and ethical 
implications? Did Penn State’s reaction to this crisis set a worthy precedent for future college 
football programs enduring controversial image crises? This thesis will critically examine the 
steps Penn State took to address the crisis, analyzing how effective its reaction was. It will also 
explore the consequences of PSU’s actions in terms of public reception, and finally will include 
recommendations for a better handling of this crisis and suggestions for future crisis 
communication procedures in college football.  
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Advice to Future Honors Students  
My advice for honors students is to think about what truly captivates and excites you. Pick a 
topic that you are interested in, and get to know it inside and out. Also, don’t wait until the last 
minute – especially if you are a December graduate! I speak from experience when I reiterate the 
saying that “the best way to get something done is to begin.” And in the words of Nelson 
Mandela: “It always seems impossible until it’s done.” Get excited, and get moving. Also, enjoy 
the process! The end of your college career is bittersweet, so soak up every moment – even late 
nights typing away on your computer with coffee in hand. This project will challenge you, but it 
will ultimately reward you. Don’t give up. 
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Chapter 1: Crisis Communication Best Practices 
Defining a Crisis  
In the words of Nobel Peace Prize recipient and former Secretary of State Dr. Henry 
Kissinger, “an issue ignored is a crisis invited” (Jordan-Meier, 2011, ch. 1). Historically, pushing 
problems aside and refusing to confront them as they arise only results in a buildup of negative 
issues that ultimately boil over into a full-blown crisis. As this thesis will later address, the Penn 
State child sex abuse scandal did exactly that – what began as a severe and horrible problem, 
initiated by one man, grew into years of lies, administrative cover-ups and a widespread lack of 
accountability. This resulted in many children’s emotional and physical harm as well as a major 
character and image crisis for a widely respected, nationally recognized and government-funded 
institution.  
Strategic communications expert Jane Jordan-Meier describes the root of most corporate 
crises as a company’s doing “something wrong, illegal, unethical, or immoral and [trying] to 
hide it” (2011, ch. 1). She explains that all crises are incited by triggering events, whether by 
disgruntled employees speaking out or through the media’s exposure of an issue that has been 
swept under the rug – known as a “smoldering issue” (Jordan-Meier, 2011, ch. 1). Classic 
examples of such issues include the Toyota vehicle recall crisis of 2010 or the BP oil disaster; 
each of these situations involved cover-ups, as administrators failed to effectively address the 
problems at hand, resulting in major consequences including lost lives and extreme 
environmental damage (Jordan-Meier, 2011, ch. 1).  
Crisis management, in the eyes of industry veteran Jonathan Bernstein, is considered “the 
art of avoiding trouble when you can, and reacting appropriately when you can’t” (Bernstein & 
Bonafede, 2011, ch. 1). He says it is an art, not a science, because no single clear-cut formula can 
be applied to all crises to ensure an effective solution (Bernstein & Bonafede, 2011, ch. 1). Crisis 
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management differs from traditional public relations in the sense that it is reactive, as opposed to 
proactive, and deals with media exposure in a threatening environment; this results in targeted 
messages designed to address a problem, rather than seeking publicity to simply increase brand 
recognition and build one’s image (Bernstein & Bonafede, 2011, ch. 1). To use a football 
metaphor, public relations is the offense, while crisis management is the defense. One can build 
upon a positive image, scoring touchdown after touchdown with relevant media coverage of 
events and initiatives, but all it takes is a single, devastating turnover – a crisis – to turn the game 
around and put the organization in a defensive position as it works desperately to protect what 
remains of its image and good name while re-building the public’s trust it has lost, all under the 
blinding spotlight of the (oftentimes national) media. 
Crisis Coverage in the Media  
Crisis communications consultant Jeff Ansell, who has helped Fortune 500 companies 
manage high-profile crises, and author Jeffrey Leeson explain that now more than ever before, 
the public holds companies and institutions accountable to be “genuine and trustworthy” (2010, 
ch. 1). The Edelman Trust Barometer shows continually decreasing public trust in corporate 
leaders in the United States, especially when they are seen as spokespeople in the media (Ansell 
& Leeson, 2010, ch. 1). This is due to not only the unethical actions and decisions of corporate 
leaders, but the words that create the illusion of a shallow, broken record when addressing the 
media in times of crisis:  
“The current model for media training is broken because it calls on spokespeople to 
ignore questions and repeat “key” messages. Each time a nonresponsive message is 
repeated, a layer of credibility is stripped away from the speaker” (Ansell & Leeson, 
2010, ch. 1). 
 
With the advent of social media, public backlash and outcry now spreads like wildfire; 
Twitter, for example, is not only a vehicle for citizen journalists, but also a speedy, real-time 
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platform for traditional media outlets to disseminate breaking news (Jordan-Meier, 2011, ch. 2). 
One of the most challenging aspects of crisis communication is the lack of control practitioners 
have over these media outlets. Jordan-Meier insists that in the midst of a crisis, communication – 
in terms of coverage by news media – shapes the public’s opinion, determining “how 
communities act, think, and feel about an organization’s reputation, its values, and its actions” 
(2011, ch. 2). She stresses the importance of managing media and staying in the conversation in 
times of crisis, explaining the news’ malleability as a participatory, two-way street driven by our 
conversations, opinions and reactions (Jordan-Meier, 2011, ch. 3). And while social media plays 
a major role – a 2010 study showed 61 percent of Americans get at least some of their news 
online – traditional mainstream media outlets are still powerful, as 78 percent of Americans get 
their news from local TV stations, 73 percent from cable stations like CNN or Fox and 50 
percent from local newspapers (Jordan-Meier, 2011, ch. 3). Jordan-Meier says that despite these 
high figures, relying on traditional media outlets as the sole way to reach an audience means 
practitioners could miss much of their audience and fail at getting the full story out, as the one-to 
three-minute segments that comprise local TV news stories are too short to tell the whole story 
(Jordan-Meier, 2011, ch. 3). She further insists, “you will need more than the traditional media 
release and news conference to get your message out quickly to all the affected stakeholders. 
Simple fact: You need social media to help you reach them–and fast” (Jordan-Meier, 2011, ch. 
3). The news media’s ultimate goal as truth-seekers is described by Jordan-Meier as: 
“The media feel it is their duty to serve society during a crisis. But never underestimate 
the basic motivation of most journalists in a crisis—to get to the bottom of an issue, a 
crisis, and find out what really happened and who has responsibility and can be blamed… 
So, you can expect journalists to be dogged in their search for the truth, particularly if 
they think there has been wrongdoing. They will work (on society's behalf) to expose and 
investigate abuses of power and protect the public's health and safety in as many ways as 
they can, and sometimes this may lead to overexposure of the horror that they have 
witnessed firsthand” (2011, ch. 5). 
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The Stages of a Crisis  
The four stages of a crisis include (1) the breaking news stage, (2) the unfolding drama 
stage, (3) the blame game stage and (4) the resolution and fallout stage (Jordan-Meier, 2012). In 
the first stage, the media, and thus, audience, focus on the incident itself – who, what, when and 
where the event happened (Jordan-Meier, 2012). This is the initial phase of the crisis, where 
communicators must gauge the impact and degree of the crisis event – we must “pick the panic” 
and determine the immediate concerns for the organization, what people want to know and 
where they will go to find this information (Jordan-Meier, 2012). The importance of monitoring 
developments on a 24/7 basis during this phase is imperative; “communicators need to stay one 
step ahead of the story” when dealing with a crisis from an internal perspective (Jordan-Meier, 
2012). Executing a comprehensive crisis plan is paramount to succeeding at this early stage – 
collect facts, dispel rumors, decide on a key message and stick to it, and call in external support 
to help better deal with the issue at hand (Jordan-Meier, 2011, ch. 7).  
The “unfolding drama” stage begins soon after the news breaks; this is dubbed the “how” 
stage – when public interest and opinion shifts from the surface details of the incident to the 
deeper implications – the victims, the response by the organization and asking why the event 
happened in the first place (Jordan-Meier, 2012). Jordan-Meier describes this as the “make-it-or-
break-it, reputation-forming stage” (2012, ch. 9). Journalists often link stories back to previous 
events as they begin to “dig for dirt” and uncover the full truth; this is also the stage where social 
media responses gain traction (Jordan-Meier, 2011, ch. 9). Quick, open and honest responses 
acknowledging the wrongdoing at hand allows an organization to avoid some of the “blame 
game” effects that follow in stage three (Jordan-Meier, 2012). This response – including an 
apology – must be made by a deliberately chosen spokesperson who puts a face to the 
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organization during this critical time of public judgment (Jordan-Meier, 2012). Jordan-Meier 
explains the need for “speed, decisiveness, authority–and often significant courage” in times of 
crisis: 
“It does take courage to step out of the "safe" business mode and step into the public 
arena. Not only do you need to demonstrate compassion for the "victims," but you need 
to convey strong conviction for the actions you are taking” (2011, ch. 14). 
 
She describes the “grace-under-fire test” that spokespeople experience in addressing the media, 
and the importance of choosing the right person for the job (Jordan-Meier, 2011, ch. 14). The 
“classic spokesperson approach” involves choosing a senior-level leader who not only 
recognizes the true concerns of the situation but is prepared, trained and shows a human side 
(Jordan-Meier, 2011, ch. 15). The role of the apology in this phase is key, and consists of five 
parts: act quickly, be specific and honest, give heartfelt remorse, shut up and listen, and make it 
right (Jordan-Meier, 2011, ch. 26). Language choices are also a major factor: 
“The challenge in any situation, and particularly in a crisis, is to get your message across 
succinctly, effectively, and efficiently. While the traditional media have the final say in 
what is printed or broadcast, you can influence the results because public audiences 
aggregate, share, and tweet what you say and how you say it. The key is to be quotable 
and memorable, and to use simple, plain English” (Jordan-Meier, 2011, ch. 28). 
 
While the tenets of crafting an effective crisis response message seem simple, sticking to 
the basics has proven to be the best way to get the message across, sans jargon and vague, 
sweeping statements. Keeping sentences short and direct, using simple words and avoiding 
qualifiers and the word “but” will allow the message to remain clear (Ansell & Leeson, 2010, ch. 
4). In addressing the public during a crisis, spokespeople must exhibit the “three C’s of 
credibility:” compassion, competence and confidence (Bernstein & Bonafede, 2011, ch. 6). The 
tone of the response is critical in shaping public perception of the organization; from the moment 
the crisis or controversy arises, having a sense of how you want to be perceived by the public 
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will help determine the course of action (Ansell & Leeson, 2010, ch. 2). To expert Jeff Ansell, 
“there is much to be gained by projecting an image of openness, honesty, and empathy” (Ansell 
& Leeson, 2010, ch. 2). To do this, he asks clients a key question: “Money aside and lawyers 
aside, what’s the right thing to do?” (Ansell & Leeson, 2010, ch. 2). By staying true to the 
character tenets of honesty and justice – in essence, using one’s “value compass” (explained in 
the next section) for guidance – organizational credibility and trust can be regained even in the 
ugliest of crises (Ansell & Leeson, 2010, ch. 2). It is essential to put a face to the greater 
organization, and that spokesperson must be sincere in conveying the organizational response, 
and cannot simply defer to facts or figures in an attempt to defend the actions causing the crisis 
(Ansell & Leeson, 2010, ch. 3). Rather, by appealing to the emotions of the public that are the 
foundation of their outrage at the crisis, the spokesperson can set the organization off on the right 
foot to an empathetic, action-driven resolution (Ansell & Leeson, 2010, ch. 3).  
As the initial shock of the crisis starts to settle, the “how” moves to “why” as people look 
to point fingers (Jordan-Meier, 2012). Here, it is important to highlight the steps the organization 
is taking to ensure that mistakes like this will not happen again (Jordan-Meier, 2012). 
Practitioners may consider joining a conversation with critics, addressing the crisis head-on in a 
strategic way; this allows the organization to maintain some control and drive the strategy, thus 
contributing to the shaping of public opinion (Jordan-Meier, 2012). Legal implications can 
complicate what an organization is ‘allowed’ to say in the midst of a crisis, but saying nothing is 
usually not the solution. The court of public opinion is an extremely receptive one, and by giving 
it nothing to work with, an organization misses a chance to educate and thereby set the story 
straight (Bernstein & Bonafede, 2011, ch. 10). Bernstein insists that “no communication is 
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communication,” and by staying silent due to fear or an attorney’s advice, an organization can 
dig itself into a deeper hole (Bernstein & Bonafede, 2011, ch. 10). He further states: 
“Failing to communicate during a crisis is, in the eyes of the public, an admission of 
guilt. In the majority of cases (unless the evidence is demonstrably otherwise), the public 
generally suspends forming a judgment until it has heard enough information to do so. If 
your organization remains silent, you essentially pass up the opportunity to speak to the 
public when it’s at its most receptive. Point this out to your organization’s decision 
makers. Remind them that in this instance silence is not golden” (Bernstein & Bonafede, 
2011, ch. 10). 
 
Of course, responding to a crisis in the public eye while under official investigation presents its 
own challenges. Bernstein’s recommendations for handling this situation include practicing 
transparency, providing access, cooperating with officials and exerting a public image of 
confidence (Bernstein & Bonafede, 2011, ch. 15).  
The final stage of a crisis occurs when the dust truly starts to settle – the organization 
recognizes the “lessons learned” from the crisis and acknowledges its transition – be it ‘back to 
normal’ in terms of putting a product back on the shelf or, in the case of PSU, moving on to a 
new phase where the organization strives to do better and be a stronger, more responsible 
institution (Jordan-Meier, 2012). Monitoring public opinion and being active during this final 
stage is crucial to ensuring the crisis does not take on a new life of its own; practitioners must not 
only communicate solutions to the public, but also take action (Jordan-Meier, 2011, ch. 11). 
Demonstrating solutions, rebuilding relationships and showing continued empathy toward the 
victims, all while monitoring media coverage, are the first steps to reaching that ‘new normal’ in 
a post-crisis environment (Jordan-Meier, 2011, ch. 11). Recovering the losses and repairing the 
damage done by a crisis can be a tall task, and must be done continually over time (Bernstein & 
Bonafede, 2011, ch. 8). Doing an honest appraisal of the damage allows an organization to gauge 
what internal areas need improvement, as public relations is only one function of a crisis 
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(Bernstein & Bonafede, 2011, ch. 8). Conducting a post-crisis analysis is key, as the PR team can 
determine the strengths and weaknesses of its actions and learn from its mistakes while 
proactively preparing for any future crises (Bernstein & Bonafede, 2011, ch. 8). Part of this 
includes conducting a “vulnerability audit,” which involves an organization scanning for other 
potential crises and determining what its weaknesses are that could result in problems down the 
road (Bernstein & Bonafede, 2011, ch. 8).  Creating a plan and being ahead of the curve allows 
organizations to be ready the next time a controversy strikes, and preparedness is half the battle.  
The Value Compass  
Jeff Ansell uses a tool called the value compass (Figure 1.1) in dealing with “public 
battles and situations that are unlikely to be won in the court of public opinion” (Ansell & 
Leeson, 2010, ch. 2). This incorporates the spokesperson’s nature and standards while taking into 
account the stakeholders’ emotion and well-being – all key elements to consider when publicly 
responding to controversy that is plainly seen as wrong and inexcusable (Ansell & Leeson, 2010, 
ch. 2). Charting out a value compass allows an organization to acknowledge the tone and 
perception it wants to create for itself, while recognizing the emotions of its stakeholders and the 
consequences and effects of its actions on said stakeholders. First, a practitioner must consider 
who the stakeholders are in the crisis situation. Then, determine words to describe the nature of 
the organization, which will be conveyed through the spokesperson, in the context of the 
situation (Ansell & Leeson, 2010, ch. 2). For example, “honest, humble and sincere” were the 
words chosen by Ansell’s client to shape the nature of addressing a tax evasion crisis. Next, the 
standards which the organization wants to live up to and project to the public in its crisis 
response are identified (for example, “accountable, credible and truthful” (Ansell & Leeson, 
2010, ch. 2). Then the stakeholders’ emotions are identified (e.g. anger, contempt and disgust), 
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along with the steps to take to promote their well-being (e.g. action, apologize and 
responsiveness) (Ansell & Leeson, 2010, ch. 2). Finally, the most important element from each 
of these four lists is written to form a comprehensive “NEWS” – Nature, Emotions, Well-being, 
Standards – filter to be used in molding messages to the media and public (Ansell & Leeson, 
2010, ch. 2). Ansell’s example of a NEWS filter includes “honest, anger, responsiveness and 
accountable” as the four tenets to remember when crafting a response to a crisis – being truthful, 
recognizing the public’s anger, responding to said anger through action and being held 
accountable to specific standards of credibility and ethics will ensure the best possible response 
to an agitated and outraged audience (Ansell & Leeson, 2010, ch. 2). While it is a simple 
concept, the idea of the value compass could go far in helping an organization to stay true to 
itself in times of extreme crisis. By acknowledging who its stakeholders are and how they are 
reacting, along with determining what perception it wants these stakeholders to receive from its 
course of action, an organization can go about crafting its crisis response messages with an ear to 
the ground, never losing sight of who it strives to reach, how to do it and why. Identifying and 
sticking to organizational values is crucial in times of crisis, as an organization will be tested by 
the untrusting public and must communicate the way in which it strives to be – and do – better 
before regaining public trust. 
Regaining Lost Public Trust  
Jeff Ansell identifies a Washington University research study that states there are two 
types of trust violations: a breach of integrity, like an athlete’s steroid use or politician’s 
extramarital affair, or a lack of competency that reflects the organizations’ abilities and 
knowledge (or lack thereof), like an airline’s pattern of delays or a medical malpractice suit 
(Ansell & Leeson, 2010, ch. 3). Interestingly enough, the study showed that denying integrity-
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based allegations works best, because it is extremely difficult to bounce back from the label of 
“liar” or “thief” in the public eye (Ansell & Leeson, 2010, ch. 3). In the case of competency-
based offenses, a clear apology and explanation of why it will not happen again was identified as 
the best plan of action (Ansell & Leeson, 2010, ch. 3). Ansell identifies four guiding principles to 
“help build trust and ensure that comments are not interpreted as dishonest or dismissive” when 
interacting with the media during a public relations crisis: 
 • Show humility. 
 • Answer honestly. 
 • Acknowledge skepticism. 
 • Couple concern with commitment to action. 
 (Ansell & Leeson, 2010, ch. 3) 
 
Conveying a balance of confidence and humility allows an organization to avoid being perceived 
as cocky or insensitive, while also preventing it from being seen as weak (Ansell & Leeson, 
2010, ch. 3). Being honest, especially in addressing a crisis that stems from a pattern of 
dishonesty and deceit, is a fundamental element of crisis response. Ansell states, “when 
executives and spokespeople shy away from being honest, the truth has a way of catching up 
with them. Not being honest or not coming across as honest makes a spokesperson look and 
sound evasive and untrustworthy” (Ansell & Leeson, 2010, ch. 3). The third principle, 
acknowledging skepticism, is a way to legitimize the public’s concern, as it enhances credibility 
and shows that the organization itself is not shying away from the painful truth (Ansell & 
Leeson, 2010, ch. 3). Ansell uses the example of the Catholic Church’s sex abuse scandal to 
demonstrate this idea, as Father James Flavin of Boston acted as a voice for priests who were 
outraged by the cover-up, saying, “I wouldn’t trust other priests right now, either” (Ansell & 
Leeson, 2010, ch. 3). This showed that the priest himself was on the same page as the public in 
terms of concern, and that he realized the gravity of the situation and was not opposed to 
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addressing it head-on despite his position as a leader within the institution undergoing the crisis. 
While showing concern is the first step, pairing it with a commitment to further action will 
ensure the public that change will actually be incited and similar mistakes will not happen again. 
As Ansell expresses, “concern without action is meaningless rhetoric” (Ansell & Leeson, 2010, 
ch. 3). Speculation is not a substitute for this; empty promises will only aggravate the already 
upset stakeholders (Ansell & Leeson, 2010, ch. 3). To avoid speculation, Ansell recommends 
sticking to the values set forth in an organization’s value compass – for example, remaining 
empathetic and promising further action, like research and bringing in experts to determine ways 
to alleviate the problem, can go a long way (Ansell & Leeson, 2010, ch. 3).  
Bernstein similarly identifies five key tenets of crisis communications: be prompt, 
compassionate, honest, informative and interactive (Bernstein & Bonafede, 2011, ch. 6). Again, 
these seem like common sense – but companies all too often overlook the basics when 
attempting to quell a crisis in the media. Being prompt will help to ensure that the rumor mill is 
limited; by avoiding the issue and putting off a response, minds will only wander and reporters 
will try harder to dig deeper to get to the bottom, which will only hurt the organization’s ability 
to control its message in the long run (Bernstein & Bonafede, 2011, ch. 6). Being compassionate 
and honest allows the public to see that an organization is truly sorry; it humanizes the institution 
and immediately targets the emotions of stakeholders, setting the foundation to rebuild trust. 
Finally, the response must be both informative and interactive – facts and figures will answer 
questions and set the record straight, while two-way communication with stakeholders fosters 
cooperation and loyalty on their part, rather than further resistance (Bernstein & Bonafede, 2011, 
ch. 6).  
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The Page Philosophy  
Renowned public affairs guru Arthur W. Page established seven principles to guide 
communicators in the corporate realm. His philosophy was based on truth, character, interactive 
communication and ultimately serving the public interest (Arthur W. Page Society): 
“The successful corporation, Page believed, must shape its character in concert with the 
nation’s. It must operate in the public interest, manage for the long run and make 
customer satisfaction its primary goal. He described the dynamic this way: “Real success, 
both for big business and the public, lies in large enterprise conducting itself in the public 
interest and in such a way that the public will give it sufficient freedom to serve 
effectively”” (Arthur W. Page Society).  
The guiding principles underlying this philosophy include: 
 • Tell the truth. 
 • Prove it with action. 
 • Listen to the customer. 
 • Manage for tomorrow. 
 • Conduct public relations as if the whole company depends on it. 
 • Realize a company’s true character is expressed by its people. 
 • Remain calm, patient and good-humored. 
 (Arthur W. Page Society). 
 
The simplicity and clarity of these concepts is striking, and they could not be more relevant to 
crisis management. The idea of honesty tied to action, listening to stakeholders and being 
proactive in “managing for tomorrow” are all key elements of effective crisis response, and they 
stem from the people behind the operation. Especially in times of crisis, the way an organization 
deals with the media and the public will help determine its reception in the court of public 
opinion.  
As this thesis will soon explore, Penn State’s response to the Jerry Sandusky child sex 
abuse scandal succeeded in putting some of these ideas to practice, while failing to carry out 
others. The plainly disturbing and inexcusable nature of the scandal made it a difficult one to 
manage. Denying the allegations or trying to let the issue pass could only go so far, as the case 
was not only integrity-based but also competency-based once the years of administrative cover-
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ups were exposed.  Perhaps if Penn State crisis communicators had used tools like the value 
compass and issued a clear apology and explanation of a plan of action from the beginning, they 
could have avoided some of the widespread public distrust that resulted from the scandal.  
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Chapter 2: The Penn State Football Scandal 
Penn State Football: Historical Context  
For Pennsylvania State University, the football program is king. State College, PA, 
known affectionately by Penn State faithful as Happy Valley, sits in the middle of the state, a 
rural area with little acclaim for anything besides education and the product of its intense and 
unceasing pride: college football. The second-largest stadium in the country, Beaver Stadium 
seats 106,572 fans and PSU consistently places in the top five FBS schools for average home 
attendance (Penn State Athletics, 2013). As of 2013, the Penn State football team held a 257-65 
on-field record at home, though all wins from 1998-2011 were later vacated due to the NCAA’s 
sanctions regarding the scandal that is the subject of this thesis (Penn State Athletics, 2013). 
Students are rabid fans, as over 21,000 student season tickets are sold each year (Penn State 
Athletics, 2013). They often camp out for multiple days to get the best seats in “Nittanyville,” a 
makeshift tent city outside the stadium, and have been dubbed one of, if not the most passionate 
student sections in the nation by the college football media (Penn State Athletics, 2013). The rich 
history of the program spans over 125 years, featuring such striking statistics as 723 wins, 27 
bowl victories, 97 first-team All-Americans, 51 academic All-Americans and an impressive 91 
percent NCAA graduation rate (Penn State Athletics, 2013).  
Joe Paterno, known by the public as JoePa, was hired as an assistant coach by Penn State 
in 1950, rising to the position of head coach in 1966 – one where he remained until 2011, 
amassing an unprecedented record of 409-136-3 in 46 seasons (Penn State Athletics, 2013). 
Paterno, the winningest coach in major college football history by a long shot, was the beloved 
face of the Penn State program during his tenure there and continues to be idolatrized by Penn 
State students and alumni despite his controversial role in allegedly allowing the heinous acts of 
his longtime assistant and friend, Jerry Sandusky, to go on over a 14-year span (Weinreb, 2011). 
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PSU alumnus Michael Weinreb described growing up in State College, becoming engrained in 
the Penn State football culture and worshiping Paterno as a hero figure, placing him on a 
pedestal that has now been cast in shadow: 
“Sometimes we were guilty of regarding him as more deity than man, as if he presided 
over us in mythological stand-up form. He was as much our own conscience as he was a 
football coach, and we made that pact and imbued him with that sort of power because 
we believed he would wield it more responsibly than any of us ever could. Maybe that 
was naïve, but we came of age in a place known as Happy Valley and naïveté was part of 
the package, and now that word isn’t in our dictionaries anymore” (2011). 
 
He was well-known not only for his on-field feats, but also his determination to carry out 
what he called “the Grand Experiment” – building a football program of superior quality on and 
off the field, marrying big-time athletics with academics (Weinreb, 2011). He held players to 
high standards, but to further champion this cause Paterno raised millions of dollars for Penn 
State and his name remains on the Paterno Library at the University Park campus (Weinreb, 
2011). LA Times writer and PSU alumnus Shawn Hubler, who grew up in central Pennsylvania 
and graduated from Penn State, describes her family’s worship-like obsession with Paterno as 
one stemming from his sense of class:  
“The coach never bragged. He never gloated. He didn’t put up with undignified antics. 
He made sure his players got a good education, like his, and were set for a life beyond 
football…Penn State was the way to success, and, we felt, there was no greater success 
than to end up like Paterno – good family, good work ethic, accomplishment in 
something of value. And Penn State football was very much ‘of value.’ It could lift a 
young man up and out from a place like ours to a finer life and destination, and turn him 
into the kind of person we wanted to be” (2011). 
 
He passed away from lung cancer in 2012, just two months after his firing amid the 
drama of the unfolding Sandusky scandal. Still, Paterno’s legacy proved to be alive and well in 
November 2011, when Penn State students rioted in the streets of State College over the news of 
his firing (Schweber, 2011). Thousands of them chanted Paterno’s name, screamed the famous 
“We are Penn State” chant, tore down lamp posts and street signs, threw rocks, overturned a 
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television news van and stood on cars to protest the firing, resulting in police control via 
protective riot gear and pepper spray (Schweber, 2011). Some felt the media were unfairly 
blaming the scandal on Paterno, resulting in his downfall; others were angry at the board of 
trustees’ decision to terminate Paterno’s contract; and still others were simply heartbroken, in 
tears at the whole situation (Schweber, 2011). Clearly, the passion of the Penn State student body 
for their beloved football coach – resorting to violence and aggression at his removal – shows the 
immense status of the football program in the daily life of State College, PA. Sportswriter and 
Penn State alumnus Michael Weinreb describes the “culture of unrest” so prevalent on the Penn 
State campus, one that was omnipresent both before and after the scandal broke: 
“We do this a lot at Penn State, gather in spontaneous groups to celebrate football 
victories or party weekends or nothing at all, and even when I was involved with it, I 
couldn’t explain why. Back before they figured out ways to collapse goalposts, we rushed 
the field to take them down ourselves. In 1990, when Craig Fayak kicked the game-
winning field goal, a group of students leapt the fences of Beaver Stadium, tore down the 
goalposts, and deposited them on the front lawn of Joe Paterno’s house, all of which 
wouldn’t seem so odd except that the game was played in South Bend, 500 miles away. 
In 1993, when the Phillies won the National League pennant, we clogged Beaver Canyon, 
jumped around for a while, and then went home. When bin Laden was killed, thousands 
of students clogged the streets, chanted “U-S-A!,” and then went away. 
Again, I can’t say definitively why we do these things, and I am deeply ashamed by the 
violence that occurred in the wee hours of Thursday morning, with the world peering in 
on our town as it never had before. Maybe it’s the omnipresence of alcohol, and maybe 
it’s a party culture that’s been honed over the course of several decades, and maybe it’s 
just the sense that we’re young and invulnerable and want to express ourselves in some 
way on a campus that keeps growing and growing, at a university that’s so unbelievably 
big that it can easily swallow your identity. 
Then again, there are a lot of things about Penn State that I can’t explain today” (2011). 
 
To set the stage for an analysis of the handling of unprecedented scandal, one must understand 
that the cult-like obsession with football so omnipresent in State College is arguably unlike any 
devotion to sport on any other campus. Penn State football – a program nicknamed “Linebacker 
U” for its tradition of success at the position – is described by New York Times sportswriter 
George Vecsey as “the central fact of life in the state:” “When a large male newborn is on 
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display in the hospital nursery, people make loving jokes about sending him out to JoePa to play 
linebacker. Not so funny at the moment, is it?” (Vecsey, 2011). Vecsey believes the idea of 
‘football as king’ – placing a football program at the penthouse of a university’s priorities – 
serves as an institutional impetus for immorality and skewed value systems, and one that was 
clearly exemplified at Penn State through this scandal (Vecsey, 2011). He points out the danger 
of the traditional “old-boy system” in place at Penn State for so many years, one that caused the 
university managed to ignore the fact that children’s lives were being destroyed in order to 
continue on with life as always, furthering the progress and elevating the status of the already 
championship-caliber football program (Vecsey, 2011). Michael Weinreb waxes poetic about the 
power of college football to unite people – a power that became so colossal at Penn State that it 
swallowed academics, administration and ethics in a time of unthinkable transgression, resulting 
in major strife and scandal: 
“But this is why college football evokes such extreme emotion, and this is why schools 
work so damn hard and often take ethical shortcuts to forge themselves into football 
powers: If they are successful, then the game serves as the lifelong bond between alums 
and townspeople and the university, thereby guaranteeing the institution’s self-
preservation through donations and season-ticket sales and infusions into the local 
economy. It is a crass calculus, when you put it that way, which is why there will always 
be skeptics and there will always be those of us for whom college football is (other than 
our own families) the purest emotional attachment of our adulthood, and there will 
always be some of us who bound between those two poles” (2011). 
 
Clearly, the context in which the 2011 Penn State child sex abuse scandal took place was an 
emotionally charged one with a laundry list of stakeholders: powerful administrators and 
coaches, passionate students, loyal alumni and fans, dedicated players, skeptical media and 
ultimately, helpless victims. The details of what happened are so horrible as to be almost 
inconceivable, and the way in which the university dealt with the aftermath is a topic of 
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controversy that will later be explored. First, the situation – the scandal – itself will be described 
and assessed. 
Details of the Scandal  
In March 2011, Sara Ganim of The Patriot-News in Harrisburg, PA reported that former 
Penn State defensive line coach Jerry Sandusky was being investigated by a grand jury regarding 
allegations of indecently assaulting a teenage boy (Ganim, 2011). The allegation was made by a 
15-year-old boy in 2009, and at the time the article was published, the grand jury was in the 
midst of hearing testimony for over 18 months (Ganim, 2011). Ganim wrote that PSU head 
football coach Joe Paterno, along with athletic director Tim Curley and then-former university 
vice president Gary Schultz had testified (2011). The allegation was especially disturbing given 
Sandusky’s extensive access to young boys through the charity he ran. The Second Mile was 
founded in 1977 as outreach for thousands of underprivileged youths in Pennsylvania through 
summer and year-round camps (Ganim, 2011). The allegation in question stemmed from a high 
school in Pennsylvania where Sandusky served as volunteer football coach, and the incident of 
inappropriate touching – having happened several times over a four-year period – was reported 
by the boy’s mother to the principal and football coach (Ganim, 2011). The then-superintendent 
of Keystone Central School District, John DiNunzio, called the entire ordeal a “hush-hush 
situation,” saying he never heard a word back from police after passing on the report (Ganim, 
2011). Sandusky quit as a volunteer high school coach in 2009, saying he wanted to devote more 
time to his charity – from which he then soon retired, less than two years later (Ganim, 2011). 
The rumor mill began to churn around this time, and soon word came out about a May 1998 
allegation of “inappropriate contact against Sandusky by another boy” (Ganim, 2011). The then-
12-year-old claimed Sandusky showered with him in the locker room of the Lasch Building on 
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Penn State’s campus and inappropriately touched him while there (Ganim, 2011). At the point of 
Ganim’s article being published, no charges had been filed against Sandusky, as the 
Pennsylvania grand jury served as a way for prosecutors to further probe for and investigate 
“potential crimes,” allowing them the power to compel witness testimony through subpoenas and 
do so in secret, without media scrutiny (Ganim, 2011). A key note regarding this investigation, in 
terms of internal inquiry within the Penn State administration, is that a trustee who saw Ganim’s 
article asked about the investigation at a board meeting; then-president Graham Spanier 
responded by “briefing trustees…but [did] not raise the issue of its impact on the university,” and 
the board “[took] no action to investigate further” (Sablich, Fessenden, & McLean, 2011). Penn 
State then declined to comment when questioned about the investigation (ESPN.com news 
services, 2011). In a January 2012 press conference, then-chairwoman of the board, Karen Peetz, 
acknowledged the essence of deception conveyed to the board by Spanier in this short briefing; 
she claims the board did not truly become aware of the situation until the same time the public 
did, in November 2011 (Progress, 2012).  
On November 5, 2011, Jerry Sandusky was arrested and subsequently released on 
$100,000 bail after an arraignment on 40 criminal counts related to child molestation (ESPN.com 
news services, 2011). This same day, PSU athletic director Tim Curley and university vice 
president Gary Schultz were charged with perjury and “failure to report what they knew of the 
allegations” (Sablich et al., 2011). This launched Penn State into a flurry of media coverage and 
ensuing public outrage, as Sandusky’s arrest was the spark that began a firestorm of controversy 
and scandal, not only at the heinous acts he committed, but also on the administration that 
supposedly knew about it and failed to stop it. Within two days of the arrest, Penn State 
announced Curley and Schultz were stepping down, and a day later, public pressure to oust 
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Paterno and Spanier grew nationwide, causing Penn State to “abruptly [cancel] Paterno’s regular 
weekly news conference” (ESPN.com news services, 2011).  On November 9, 2011, Joe Paterno 
publicly announced his impending retirement at the conclusion of the football season (Sablich et 
al., 2011). This announcement was made without board approval, and later that day the board 
announced the firing of both Paterno and PSU President Graham Spanier (Sablich et al., 2011). It 
was soon announced that defensive coordinator Tom Bradley would take over as interim head 
coach and provost Rodney Erickson would serve as interim PSU president (ESPN.com news 
services, 2011). Sandusky’s first extended public comments since his arrest came on November 
14, 2011, in a Bob Costas interview televised nationally – he claimed innocence, saying he was 
not a pedophile, but did say “I shouldn’t have showered with those kids” (Sablich et al., 2011).  
More than seven months after this scandal broke, Sandusky was convicted of the sexual 
abuse of 10 boys spanning 15 years and found guilty on 45 of 48 counts (Sablich, et al., 2011). 
This resulted in a sentence of 30-60 years in prison (CNN Library, 2014). On July 12, 2012, the 
Freeh Report – an extensive document detailing the results of an independent investigation of the 
scandal – was published by Louis J. Freeh, former federal judge and F.B.I. director (Sablich et 
al., 2011). This report was damning not only for Sandusky, but for “four of the most powerful 
people at The Pennsylvania Statue University,” Spanier, Schultz, Curley and Paterno as it 
claimed they “failed to protect against a child sexual predator harming children for over a 
decade” and “concealed Sandusky’s activities from the Board of Trustees, the University 
community and authorities” (Freeh, Sporkin, & Sullivan, LLP, 2012). The Freeh Report detailed 
the “total and consistent disregard by the most senior leaders at Penn State for the safety and 
welfare of Sandusky’s child victims,” highlighting failures on the part of administrators, coaches 
and the board of trustees itself to adequately investigate and handle the alleged abuse by 
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Sandusky, thereby allowing the abuse to continue and more victims to be affected (Freeh et al., 
2012). While the abuse itself is inherently horrific, what further shocked the public were the 
administrative lapses committed by those who witnessed or were aware of Sandusky showering 
with young boys on Penn State’s campus. One key figure in this controversy exposed by Freeh 
was a Penn State assistant coach and former graduate assistant and player, Michael McQueary. 
In February 2001, McQueary witnessed Sandusky forcibly having sex with a young boy in the 
showers of the football facility at Penn State; he reported the incident the following day to Joe 
Paterno, who told him, “you did what you had to do. It’s my job now to figure out what we want 
to do” (Freeh et al., 2012). Following McQueary’s reporting of the incident, Paterno, Spanier, 
Schultz (who was in charge of the campus police force) and Curley – in various meetings and 
email correspondence – debated what action to take, ultimately deciding against notifying state 
child welfare authorities and only telling officials from Sandusky’s charity, The Second Mile 
(Becker, 2012). They agreed to make an effort to encourage Sandusky to seek professional help, 
prevent him from bringing children to campus (Becker, 2012). Jo Becker of the New York Times 
reported: 
“Not reporting the accusation to the authorities, the men determined, was the 
more “humane” way to deal with Sandusky, according to the e-mails…Lawyers 
for Curley and Schultz, contacted about the e-mails, issued a statement saying in 
part: “For Curley, Schultz, Spanier and Paterno, the responsible and ‘humane’ 
thing to do” in 2001 “was to carefully and responsibly assess the best way to 
handle vague but troubling allegations. Faced with tough situations, good people 
try to do their best to make the right decisions.”” (2012). 
 
Blame has been a major element of public reactions to this entire scandal – many placed it on 
McQueary for not using his physical presence as a 6’5 former football player to simply stop the 
abuse from happening as he witnessed it (Van Natta Jr., 2014). Regardless of how the chain of 
command was utilized in this case – from McQueary reporting it to Paterno to Paterno reporting 
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it to Curley, to Spanier, et cetera – it is clear that there were major lapses in administrative 
judgment in play which ultimately caused more boys to continue being sexually abused for 
nearly ten years.  
Though Paterno was not charged with perjury as his colleagues were, he received intense 
public scrutiny for what the board of trustees described as “his failure to act more aggressively 
after learning of the attack,” calling it “a failure of leadership” (Becker, 2012). Still, public 
controversy and debate wages on regarding his actions, as he was not directly involved in the 
decision to not notify child welfare authorities; rather, he reported the incident to his higher-ups 
and let their decisions play out (Becker, 2012). His role as the face of Penn State and arguably 
the most powerful man on campus, however, makes his lack of action notable, and due to what 
he knew he is obviously pinpointed as a contributor to the cover-up efforts of university officials.  
Ten days after the Freeh Report was published and six months after Paterno’s passing, 
the infamous sculpture of Joe Paterno that stood outside of Beaver Stadium was taken down, as 
interim university president Rodney Erickson said leaving it there would be a “recurring wound 
to the multitude of individuals across the nation and beyond who have been the victims of child 
abuse” (Sablich et al., 2011). A statement from the Paterno family objected to the statue’s 
removal, saying it “does not serve the victims of Jerry Sandusky’s horrible crimes or help heal 
the Penn State community…the only way to help the victims is to uncover the full truth” (Van 
Natta Jr., 2012). ESPN reporter Don Van Natta Jr. reported PSU president Rodney Erickson 
made the decision to take down the statue but keep Paterno’s name on the university library: 
"I now believe that, contrary to is original intention, Coach Paterno's statue has become a 
source of division and an obstacle to healing in our university and beyond," Erickson said 
in his 592-word statement. "For that reason, I have decided that it is in the best interest of 
our university and public safety to remove the statue and store it in a secure location…I 
fully realize my decision will not be popular in some Penn State circles, but I am certain 
it is the right and principled decision…The library remains a tribute to Joe and Sue 
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Paterno’s commitment to Penn State’s student body and academic success and it 
highlights the positive impacts Coach Paterno had on the university. Thus I feel strongly 
that the library’s name should remain unchanged”” (Van Natta Jr., 2012) 
 
This was a key move by the university in publicly acknowledging the damning claims of the 
Freeh Report through their actions and taking down a major symbol of Paterno as hero. Feelings 
were mixed regarding the statue, as some students guarded the statue from vandals and protested 
when workers moved to take it down, yet dissenters flew a small plane across campus for three 
days with a banner claiming “Take the statue down or we will” (Van Natta Jr., 2012). Further, 
some alumni were angered at Penn State’s lack of advance notice before taking the statue down, 
saying “they promised openness but said nothing about the decision until just before the removal 
work began” (Van Natta Jr., 2012).  
The football program itself endured heavy penalties from the National Collegiate Athletic 
Association in the wake of the scandal. On July 23, 2012, The NCAA announced its sanctions 
and penalties related to the Sandusky scandal: a $60 million fine, four-year postseason ban for 
football, extensive scholarship reductions for four years and the vacation of PSU football’s wins 
from 1998-2011 (Sablich et al., 2011). Current football players (at the time) were given the 
opportunity to transfer without penalty or the NCAA mandatory year to sit out, until August 
2013 (Penn State Athletics, 2013).  
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Situation Analysis (SWOT)   
Strengths:  
• Penn State has an enormous alumni base and a major network of loyal fans  
• PSU Football has proved to be a strong brand with which many identify 
• Coverage by many national media outlets – in news and sports – allows for the messages PSU 
disseminates to be heard loud and clear 
• Joe Paterno has been long recognized as a trusted leader with high moral standards 
• Jerry Sandusky, the root of the crisis, retired in 1999 and is not a current PSU employee  
Weaknesses: 
• The media and the general public are understandably horrified and immediately skeptical of 
messages coming from PSU  
• Shifting the blame will only put the university in a worse position in the public eye than the one 
it has already assumed   
• Child sex abuse is a serious and touchy subject that strikes a very negative chord  
• The football program as a whole looks to be at fault, even if the crisis is rooted in the actions of 
one man 
• PSU must show empathy toward the victims, apologizing for the serious transgressions of its 
employees while simultaneously maintaining its image as a trusted and respected institution – a 
delicate and difficult balance to achieve 
• At the time the news is breaking, PSU is in the middle of football season and must not get 
swept up in the game instead of responding to the crisis at hand 
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Opportunities: 
• Due to Sandusky’s status as a former employee, PSU may attempt to distance itself from the 
scandal 
• PSU can use its position in the crisis to begin correcting its wrongs, through raising charitable 
donations and awareness for charities that work to prevent and treat child sex abuse 
• With the careful and deliberate crafting of crisis response messages, PSU can make amends 
with its loyal base of followers before they get so far away as to detach themselves  
• Perhaps this scandal can serve as a wakeup call for college football programs and big-time 
college athletics in general to be more transparent and ethical 
Threats: 
• National media attention puts the program in the spotlight and under the microscope, so 
immediate and effective crisis response is crucial before it gets any further out of hand 
• Sandusky has denied wrongdoing, and the scope of the abuse has not yet been officially 
determined 
• The rumor mill churns as head coach Joe Paterno, athletic director Tim Curley and university 
president Graham Spanier have been accused of playing a role in years of administrative cover-
ups, making it difficult to isolate the root of the crisis and handle it accordingly 
• Legal action from the victims and sanctions from the NCAA are likely looming, and anything 
PSU says could be used against the school later on 
 
 
 
  36 
Chapter 3: The Aftermath 
Communications Audit  
Penn State’s initial response to the breaking news of Jerry Sandusky’s arrest came in the 
form of a three-paragraph statement released by President Graham Spanier on November 5, 
2011: 
 “Statement from President Spanier 
The allegations about a former coach are troubling, and it is appropriate that they be 
investigated thoroughly. Protecting children requires the utmost vigilance. 
 
With regard to the other presentments, I wish to say that Tim Curley and Gary Schultz 
have my unconditional support. I have known and worked daily with Tim and Gary for 
more than 16 years. I have complete confidence in how they have handled the allegations 
about a former University employee. 
 
Tim Curley and Gary Schultz operate at the highest levels of honesty, integrity and 
compassion. I am confident the record will show that these charges are groundless and 
that they conducted themselves professionally and appropriately. 
 
Graham Spanier” (Progress, 2011). 
While this statement acknowledges the crisis, it places strong trust in the officials who were later 
ousted for their roles in covering up Sandusky’s actions; perhaps Spanier acted with haste in 
professing his public support of them so soon, while the crisis was still beginning to unfold. 
Further, the statement fails to address the real victims of the alleged acts – the victims. Rather, 
PSU and Spanier chose to focus on the role of its current employees in the scandal, essentially 
missing the point.  
From this point on, Penn State continued to use its university news site to post statements 
in response to the unfolding Sandusky crisis – first, the initial statement from President Spanier, 
followed by an announcement of Curley’s and Schultz’s stepping down and soon after, another 
brief statement from the board of trustees announcing the firing of both Spanier and Paterno and 
their immediate interim replacements, Dr. Rodney Erickson and Coach Tom Bradley (Figures 
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2.1 and 2.2). Within a week of the Sandusky arrest, the Penn State Board of Trustees announced 
the establishment of a special committee, headed by Merck CEO Kenneth Frazier and 
Pennsylvania secretary of education Ronald Tomalis, to investigate, “with the help of outside 
counsel…who’s responsible and what changes to Penn State policy can be made surrounding the 
Sandusky case” (Gallagher & Orso, 2011).  This announcement was made after Curley and 
Schultz announced their resignations, and interim PSU president Rodney Erickson announced his 
“full confidence in the committee to investigate ‘how responsibilities to these children failed’” 
(Gallagher & Orso, 2011).  
Penn State hesitated to make itself openly available to the media, as it abruptly canceled 
Joe Paterno’s weekly press conference the week that the scandal broke, citing legal reasons and 
refusing to reschedule it (Collier, 2011).  
On November 10, 2011, newly appointed Penn State president Rodney Erickson 
published a statement expressing his anger and sadness at the situation, acknowledging Penn 
State’s storied tradition as an institution and asking the community to join him in moving 
forward  (Figure 2.3) This statement was accompanied by a YouTube video shared on Penn 
State’s website through its YouTube account. In the video, Erickson proclaims Penn State’s 
commitment to its core values and its determination to rebuild the “trust, honor and pride that 
have endured for generations” there (Penn State University YouTube Account, 2011). Three of 
these 30-second spots were disseminated over an 11-day span, featuring Erickson standing in a 
university building reading brief statements thanking the Penn State community for their support 
and promising his intention to be a strong leader and move forward from the tragic and 
unacceptable situation at hand (Penn State University YouTube Account, 2011). He also released 
another statement on November 11, 2011, detailing five promises to the Penn State community 
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which he would carry out in response to the Sandusky crisis, including doing the right thing, 
leading by example, acting with transparency, showing respect to victims and providing any and 
all resources needed to support the investigation of the matter (Figure 2.4). The statement is 
concise and straightforward, noting Erickson’s commitment to do the right thing through 
revising PSU policies, encouraging open dialogue and providing timely updates on the Sandusky 
investigation (Figure 2.4). Still, these were words promising action, and the action took time to 
be implemented. Erickson’s first interactions with the media and exposure to the public eye were 
straightforward and consistent, but the administration was criticized for repeatedly “declining to 
make him available for an interview” and the board was questioned for failing to implement a 
full nationwide search for a new president, choosing instead to promote Erickson without 
looking beyond Penn State (Frantz, 2011). Erickson, former provost at PSU, is described as a 
man of vision and practicality – not a flashy politician or infallible leader, but a confident 
decision-maker committed to doing things the right way and protecting PSU’s academic brand 
(Frantz, 2011). 
In terms of social media, transparency was questionable at best and Penn State chose to 
err on the side of caution by staying mostly silent. In early December, the Penn State Football 
YouTube account posted a “Together We Stand” video set to uplifting emotional music with 
clips of the candlelight vigil organized by students for child abuse victims, students and student-
athletes in the classroom and on the field, successful alumni out in the world and fans at the 
stadium; this pointed out the program’s achievements and teamwork, fostering a sense of unity 
and togetherness in the face of crisis (Penn State Football YouTube Account, 2011). There was 
no direct mention of the scandal in the video, but the reasonable viewer could deduce its purpose 
as a tool to unite the community. Other than this, though, Penn State’s social media presence was 
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virtually nonexistent – the university chose to never directly acknowledge the Sandusky situation 
on social media despite the rampant buzzing on many social media platforms from students, fans, 
alumni and the general public (Agnes, 2012). Certain moments were highlighted on social media 
platforms by sports media personalities and the public, such as when Penn State and Ohio State 
players met in a moment of prayer prior to their game in honor of the victims of child abuse 
(Figure 4.1). Small but thoughtful choices like this showed sparks of awareness and initiative on 
the part of Penn State to turn the awful situation and crisis into an opportunity for improvement. 
Still, Penn State missed many opportunities by choosing not to enter the social media 
conversation itself. Social media crisis manager and consultant Melissa Agnes believes the loyal 
fan base and active community surrounding Penn State are major assets and “brand advocates” 
that could have helped ease the struggle Penn State endured in the face of so much public 
scrutiny (Agnes, 2012). She suggests the university could have made an effort to promptly 
address the scandal and have a say in controlling its message, thereby separating the institution 
from the scandal in many ways; rather than being referred to as the “Penn State Scandal” it could 
have become known solely as the “Paterno Scandal” or “The Curley and Schultz cover-up” 
(Agnes, 2012). Rather than do this, Penn State chose to stay silent and further implicate itself in 
the public eye without a steady flow of consistent and open messaging (Agnes, 2012). Agnes 
blames this lack of transparent and interactive communication for the continued aftermath of the 
scandal: 
“With their core audience screaming their want for open communication, the University 
would have been wise to open up that portal. To develop a core and consistent message, 
as well as a strategy and guidelines for responding, would have helped them position 
their brand as caring, responsive, open and, most importantly, separate from the scandal. 
The actions of a few individuals should not put the entire organization at risk, though 
they allowed it to have these kinds of repercussions. It was the public who named the 
scandal the “Penn State Crisis”, and this was a product of poor crisis communications” 
(Agnes, 2012).  
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Penn State was clearly tight-lipped with its social media presence in the face of crisis, as 
administrators instructed staff to stay silent and prohibited them from posting anything directly 
related to the scandal (Agnes, 2012). Former PSU athletics marketing intern Kelly Burns told a 
Huffington Post blogger: “Our Facebook and @PennStateFball Twitter lit up but that was 
difficult because initially we were not allowed to post…we were not permitted to post anything 
about the scandal, nor were any other people working for the University. We were told to wait 
until Old Main [Penn State’s administrative center on campus which includes the university 
president’s office] made a statement before we could say anything. So we went completely dark” 
(Scott, 2012). Burns claims there was “no crisis management plan in place whatsoever” at Penn 
State when the scandal broke, and claims that even months later in mid-2012, Penn State 
athletics staff was updating the account infrequently with bland press release-style information, 
leaving fan engagement “minimal as a result” (Scott, 2012).  
Until the death of Joe Paterno, PSU was essentially silent; the football-specific Facebook 
page posted a blue ribbon image promoting a student-run initiative for fans to wear blue to the 
upcoming football game for child abuse awareness and prevention, but other than that did not 
address the scandal (Figure 3.1). At the news of Paterno’s passing, the university’s Facebook 
page posted a memorial photo with part of a cautionary statement from President Rodney 
Erickson announcing Penn State’s intention to consider the best way to honor Paterno for his 
longtime service at the university (Figure 3.2). The statement was released on January 22, 2012 
from the president and board of trustees: 
“We grieve for the loss of Joe Paterno, a great man who made us a greater university. His 
dedication to ensuring his players were successful both on the field and in life is 
legendary and his commitment to education is unmatched in college football. His life, 
work and generosity will be remembered always. 
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The University plans to honor him for his many contributions and to remember his 
remarkable life and legacy. We are all deeply saddened. We are considering appropriate 
ways to honor the great life and legacy of Joe Paterno. The University's Department of 
Intercollegiate Athletics is consulting with members of the Penn State community on the 
nature and timing of the gathering” (Progress, 2012). 
 
The statement, released again through Penn State’s news service online, acknowledged Paterno’s 
contributions while staying cautiously hands-off regarding memorial service plans. This was 
obviously a delicate subject, as Paterno’s role in the scandal was still unclear and fans’ loyalty to 
him spanned different levels. Still, his death, which occurred several months after the scandal 
broke, was a chance for Penn State to become more active on social media, which it did through 
multiple channels – including a YouTube video compiling footage of his funeral procession in 
State College. However, the lack of social media presence sooner was a questionable way to 
handle public interaction online in the face of crisis. And later in January 2012, Penn State held a 
memorial service for Paterno at which his family and former players spoke, showing again the 
staying power of his legacy despite the uncertainty surrounding it at the time.  
Upon the release of the Freeh Report in summer 2012, PSU issued a statement accepting 
its “sad and sobering” findings and detailing its intent to act forward in a better way: 
“The focus of all of our actions going forward will be on driving a culture of honesty, 
integrity, responsible leadership and accountability at all levels and within all units of our 
institution” (Progress, 2012). 
 
With this statement, PSU also acknowledged several of the school’s initiatives to prevent and 
treat child abuse while addressing Sandusky’s victims by funding counseling, listening and 
“taking affirmative steps to address the harm they have suffered” (Progress, 2012).  The 
statement further detailed the Board of Trustees’ change in structure, announcing the creation of 
new committees within the Board and how its “oversight role” would serve to foster 
transparency and open communication within the PSU community and beyond (Progress, 2012). 
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At the conclusion of the statement, PSU announced its intent to use Freeh’s findings not only to 
correct the university’s wrongs, but also to take a proactive step in the right direction: 
“With the release of the Freeh Report we are beginning to correct our failures, promote 
healing and build a stronger tomorrow for Penn State.  We are continuing the process of 
addressing the most painful chapter in the University’s history so that we can heal and 
move forward” (Progress, 2012). 
 
Prior to this release of the Freeh Report, on February 13, 2012, Penn State launched a 
new “openness” website as a platform for publicly addressing the events associated with Jerry 
Sandusky’s arrest (Stoller, 2012). This was perhaps the best step the university took in the wake 
of the crisis, as it allowed for a communication platform and showed that it took the issue 
seriously and was devoting resources to dealing with it directly, all the while sharing its 
initiatives with the public. The website included information on fees paid by the university to 
attorneys, consultants and communications firms, highlighting the fact that “no student tuition, 
donations or state funding will be used to cover costs associated with the case” (Stoller, 2012). 
Interestingly, the university reportedly paid over 2 million dollars for the internal investigation 
and crisis communication services (Stoller, 2012). To announce the website’s launch, PSU 
issued a press release stating its role as a resource to foster a culture of openness and serve as “a 
reminder of the commitment to open communication to the fullest extent possible,” in the words 
of President Erickson (Stoller, 2012). Since then, the website has been changed to feature 
“Progress” – progress.psu.edu – to serve as both an archive for past communications and a place 
for the Penn State community to stay updated on PSU’s progress moving forward from scandal 
and staying active with current initiatives to promote awareness and prevention of child abuse 
while distancing Penn State from the heinous actions of its former employees (Progress, 2014). 
The website’s introduction explains its purpose: 
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“There is no doubt that the Penn State community continues to face challenging times. As 
we move forward and address the crisis, we are committed to supporting the prevention 
and treatment of child abuse, while also focusing on the future of this great university to 
ensure Penn State’s standing as a world-class academic and research institution” 
(Progress, 2014).  
 
It features specific sections entitled “Addressing the Crisis,” and “Supporting the Prevention and 
Treatment of Child Abuse,” with bullet points explaining such initiatives as the creation of the 
Special Investigations Task Force, the Freeh Investigation, the hiring of a full-time compliance 
officer and the development of an annual professional training programs for employees to spot 
and report child abuse (Progress, 2014). Further, the website includes links to policy changes 
including a revision of the protocols for supervising and treating minors in University-related 
programs and the Board of Trustees’ updated governance structure that focuses on more 
openness and accessibility (Progress, 2014). To directly target the problem of child abuse, the 
university announced a partnership with Praesidium Inc. – “the national leader in abuse risk 
management” – to arrange and pay for counseling services for the victims of Sandusky’s abuse 
(Progress, 2014). Penn State’s over 2.6 million dollar donation to abuse prevention included the 
funding of a new Center for the Protection of Children at Penn State Hershey Children’s 
Hospital, a partnership with and program funding for the Pennsylvania Coalition Against Rape 
and the National Sexual Violence Resource Center and the opening of a 24/7 sexual assault and 
relationship violence hotline for all Penn State campuses (Progress, 2014). Penn State also 
hosted a two-day Child Sexual Abuse Conference in October 2012 to foster awareness and 
education in a public setting; this conference has since become an annual staple in the Penn State 
Community, as it held a “Conference on Child Protection and Well-Being” in September 2013 
followed by “The Role of Parenting and Family Processes in Child Maltreatment and 
Intervention” Conference in May 2014 (Progress, 2014). Finally, Penn State established its own 
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“Network for Child Protection and Well-Being” which included the hiring of 12 new faculty 
members over the course of three years. This initiative is described as a multi-faceted approach 
to the widespread problem of child abuse:  
“The goal of this initiative is to advance knowledge, practice, education and outreach to 
combat child abuse. To date, the University has hired six faculty researchers and has 
searches in progress for six others. This cluster hire is designed to bring faculty members 
from different disciplines together to address the problem of child maltreatment in new 
ways. Significant areas of research include: human development, bio-behavioral health, 
public policy, criminology, psychology, medicine, education, nursing, human services, 
and prevention science” (Progress, 2014). 
 
The Progress website is a culmination of Penn State’s crisis communication efforts in 
relation to the Jerry Sandusky scandal, and it contains a helpful FAQ section, fact sheets 
regarding Penn State’s NCAA Sanctions and the Freeh Report, along with multiple financial 
reports, legal briefs and contact information for interested media personnel (Progress, 2014). Its 
archive of past press releases and news stories shows awareness and transparency, but perhaps its 
most proactive measure is its “Plan for Continuous Improvement” written by PSU 
communications employee Reidar Jensen (Progress, 2014). This plan details an action plan for 
each described improvement to be made, along with information on its current status and the 
official responsible for its carryout (Jensen, 2014). In regards to communication, the prescribed 
goal was to “consider appropriate communications vehicles to provide information on change 
initiatives to internal and external stakeholders” (Jensen, 2014). To do this, PSU initiated a 
national search and hired a new Vice President for Strategic Communications, Lawrence 
Lokman; Lokman and the PSU communications staff launched “Penn State Today,” a daily 
internal newsletter to better communicate within the Penn State community in July 2014 (Jensen, 
2014). Further, the crisis communications plan developed in the wake of the scandal was updated 
according to the structural changes of the Board of Trustees (Jensen, 2014). While this plan was 
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not made public, it is clear that the institution realized the need for a change and took the 
initiative to make it, and it continues to be aware and make changes several years after the initial 
crisis occurred. This shows a better understanding of crisis communications and promotes the 
idea of putting action to words – Penn State is being transparent in sharing its plans with the 
public, and updating stakeholders on progress as it happens. Other key elements of the plan 
include creating committees to come up with a statement of core values and integrate these 
values into decision-making within the university (Jensen, 2014). To do this, a “University 
Ethics Committee” was created and a new “2015-2019 University Strategic Plan” has been 
developed, with special sections addressing the “promotion of integrity and ethical behavior” 
(Jensen, 2014). Still further elements of the plan include the hiring of an Ethics Specialist to 
work to create a “Statement of Ethical Conduct” for the university, along with the hiring of an 
“Athletics Integrity Officer” to permanently occupy a seat at the table of university leadership 
and make “regular reports to the Committee on Legal and Compliance” (Jensen, 2014). This 
officer’s role includes reporting to the Athletics Integrity Council and the Board of Trustees, 
ensuring compliance with the Big Ten’s “Statement on Institutional Standards” and working to 
head the integration of academic support and athletics through a new “Academic Support Center 
for student-athletes” (Jensen, 2014). The plan further details goals and action plans for amended 
procedures in governance, human resources, information systems, legal/risk/compliance/audit 
administration, policy review, safety and security, training and development and youth programs 
(Jensen, 2014). This plan is an active list that is updated over time, as its initiatives are ongoing 
and its public presence serves as “a tool to analyze how these various changes relate to each 
other, and to other University systems and operations, in order to enhance successful 
implementation and mitigate risk” (Jensen, 2014).  This clear-cut layout of Penn State’s 
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approach to dealing with the aftermath of the Sandusky scandal and setting off on a new foot as 
an ethical, aware and transparent institution sets Penn State apart not only in communications, 
but in administrative structure and overall cohesiveness as a large and powerful establishment in 
academia, athletics and its surrounding community.  
Administrative Response  
When top administrators fail to remain transparent with the board of trustees and take 
“decisive action” to address a developing crisis, especially to the level that PSU administrators 
orchestrated a decade-long cover-up, the only real solution is to terminate them (Cooper, 2012). 
Clearly, at Penn State the football program had become a sort of “sacred cow” that abided by its 
own, isolated standards, with Paterno – the football coach – occupying the position as arguably 
the most powerful administrator on campus (Cooper, 2012). When the Freeh Report made it 
clear that Paterno and other athletic officials were involved in covering up the scandal, the best 
move for Penn State was to cut the tumors and appoint new leaders to implement a culture 
change and fresh, transparent start. Thus, the replacement of Spanier, Curley, Schultz and 
Paterno was a relatively swift and respectable decision that ultimately allowed Penn State to 
begin distancing itself from the transgressions of its former employees and get on track to 
rebuilding its reputation as a top university and football program. Still, the way Paterno’s firing 
was carried out was another point of criticism for Penn State’s response to the crisis, as it was 
done by late-night telephone call on November 9 – nearly a week after the scandal surfaced – 
and resulted in students rioting in State College, resulting in even more negative publicity for the 
school (Fahn, 2012). After a short press conference with the board where little elaboration was 
provided, media, students and supporters bombarded the Paterno residence until Joe and his wife 
came outside to make a short, informal statement acknowledging his firing and thanking the 
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Penn State community for their support while reassuring them that they would get through this 
(Ryan, 2011).  Two members of the board spoke during a press conference announcing the 
personnel changes, explaining that while the decision to fire Paterno was difficult, it was 
necessary for the long-term interest of PSU; while getting peppered with questions regarding 
Spanier and Paterno’s oustings, the board-members were hesitant to speak due to the ongoing 
investigation, as they did not want to speculate (Ryan, 2011). Although the press conference 
provided the media with an opportunity for information and some transparency on the part of the 
board, there was still a sense of a lapse between the public and the administration as they failed 
to act in a completely transparent manner or at least with a more well-trained spokesperson 
prepared to deliver more than just the initial statement (Ryan, 2011). An ongoing circumstance 
that made it difficult for Penn State to aptly craft an in-depth and effective crisis response was 
the lack of sure knowledge on the part of the board and all Penn State officials at the time the 
crisis broke, as the issue at hand involved so much internal turmoil and the investigation took 
months to be completed and culminate in a full report.  
 Some students organized and held a candlelight vigil on November 11 for the victims of 
Sandusky’s abuse, raising awareness and money for abuse survivors and calling for Spanier’s 
ousting (Penn State News, 2011 and Wolverton, 2011). Penn State covered the event by posting 
a photo gallery on its news website, but the fact this event was the first public outpouring of 
support for victims by the university community – and it was organized by students, not on the 
part of administrators – shows yet again how Penn State was slow to react while the crisis was 
still unfolding.  
Penn State turned over a new leaf on January 6, 2012, when they named Bill O’Brien, 
former offensive coordinator for the NFL’s New England Patriots, the 15th head football coach of 
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PSU (Penn State Athletics, 2013).  After leading the team to an 8-4 record in the face of intense 
public scrutiny, O’Brien was named Big Ten Coach of the Year and National Coach of the Year 
(Penn State Athletics, 2013). O’Brien’s response to the NCAA’s hard-hitting sanctions 
announced in July 2012 was textbook coach speak in the wake of administrative upheaval: “I 
knew when I accepted the position that there would be tough times ahead…but I am committed 
for the long term to Penn State and our student-athletes” (The Associated Press, 2012).  
Penn State seniors Michael Mauti and Michael Zordich pledged their commitment to the 
school and uniting the 2012 team before the start of training camp (Penn State Athletics, 2012). 
Their impassioned statement at their team meeting, filmed and released as a tweet, garnered 
public attention, especially in light of the news that the NCAA measures taken against the 
university allowed any then-current PSU players to transfer to another university and 
immediately play (Rohan, 2012). Having the support of the current team and players – the ones 
who were feeling the direct effects of the scandal, despite their lack of direct involvement – 
helped to unite the university and the entire Penn State community, providing them a current 
situation to rally around and move forward from the transgressions of the past.  
O’Brien stayed at Penn State through the 2013 football season, after which he left to 
accept a job as the head coach of the NFL’s Houston Texans. His replacement, former 
Vanderbilt head coach James Franklin, was hired in January 2014. PSU issued a statement 
detailing the reasons for its hiring choice, highlighting his accolades at Vanderbilt and history as 
a Pennsylvania native (Nelson, 2014). By this point, Penn State as a whole was emerging from 
the shadows of the scandal. Despite the still prevalent echoes of the NCAA sanctions at play, the 
replacement of top leadership, combined with initiatives related to preventing the wrongs of the 
past from happening again allowed the school and football program to move on from the dark 
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days of 2011 and 2012. Even small tweaks like adding blue ribbons to Penn State’s helmets to 
show support for child abuse victims and the ceasing of playing Neil Diamond’s ‘Sweet 
Caroline’ – which was written about a 12-year old girl and features such lyrics as “how can I hurt 
when holding you . . . warm touchin’ warm, reaching out, touching me, touching you” – showed 
Penn State’s awareness of the scandal and its intent to do better and move on (Simon, 2012). 
Penn State officials publicly said the choice to stop playing the song at games was not due to its 
questionable lyrics, though the court of public opinion accepted the move as part of a general 
shift and reaction to relieve the stain of the Sandusky scandal from the school and its football 
program (Simon, 2012). The policies outlined in “The Plan for Continuous Improvement” in 
response to the recommendations established by the Freeh Report included ceasing public access 
to the football facilities in State College, showing sincere concern and attention to public safety 
and risk prevention (Simon, 2012). 
PSU’s interim athletic director since Tim Curley’s stepping down, David Joyner, was 
officially hired as director of athletics in January 2013. Joyner released textbook comments on 
the NCAA’s sanctions: “We accept the penalties of the NCAA for the failure of leadership that 
occurred on our campus…we are deeply disappointed that some of our leaders could have turned 
a blind eye to such abuse, and agree that culture of Penn State must change” (Flounders, 2012). 
This statement flowed with the consistent messaging of the university and its administration 
post-scandal, briefly acknowledging the situation but always focusing on moving forward. 
Interestingly, applications to Penn State’s flagship campus in State College went up 2 
percent in the 2011-12 cycle, during the height of the scandal (Ruiz, 2011). Though some 
applicants called to withdraw their applications or ask about the scandal, admissions executive 
Anne Rohrbach said prospective students who came to campus for visits in the wake of the 
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scandal were “almost empathetic” and did not wish to discuss the story of the scandal (Ruiz, 
2011). Perhaps outsiders just beginning the process of becoming Penn State stakeholders were 
willing to temporarily ignore the situation due to its lack of development at that point. 
Obviously, as time went on, PSU as an institution became more entangled with the controversy, 
so the fact that Sandusky was no longer employed there did not matter, as so many others were 
involved in the cover-up – Paterno, Spanier, Curley, Schultz and McQueary.  
Overall, the administrative impetus of Penn State post-scandal was to move forward, 
effect change and carry on the strong tradition and community of the university and its storied 
football program while remaining mindful and empathetic of the victims of the horrific Sandusky 
crisis. As time progressed, the institution succeeded at doing this, but its initial response to the 
issue was questionable and it could not truly move on until after the administrative and policy 
changes were put in place and the culture of the administration was changed. During this 
process, Penn State could have remained more transparent to the public through the use of social 
media and doing more than simply releasing cookie cutter press releases. The statements did the 
job, but the rebuilding of public trust and improving the general attitude of the scrutinizing 
public toward the university took longer than it should have.  
The final chapter of this thesis will further examine the actions Penn State took, looking 
at what it could have done better and how it is currently faring, three years later.   
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Chapter 4: Evaluation 
Crosschecking PSU’s Actions with Best Practices  
Penn State suffered from a lack of preparation when this crisis broke, but it was a lack 
that was completely avoidable – having a contingency plan in place is always important, but 
when administrators are involved in a blatant cover-up, one would imagine they would be even 
more wary of the potential of a communications crisis breaking out (Fahn, 2012). The first 
misstep in its handling of the situation came in 1998 after Sandusky was initially accused of 
improper behavior with children and again in 2001 after McQueary witnessed the behavior 
– failing to proactively prepare for these issues to come to the surface, choosing to instead sweep 
them under the rug, was the underpinning of this entire scandal (Fahn, 2012). At these points, 
Spanier and his fellow administrators should have taken further action to ensure Sandusky was 
properly reported, investigated and then dealt the proper punishment, all the while working 
together to develop a consistent plan on how to deal with the situation in the face of the media 
(Fahn, 2012). During this entire series of missteps, the board of trustees was kept in the dark 
while President Spanier took it upon himself to be the sole executor of the “communications 
strategy” – if it could even be called as such (Fahn, 2012).  
Ultimately, Penn State’s crisis management tactics improved over time. But people 
defined the school’s handling of the situation by its initial reaction, which was misguided from 
the start, as Spanier’s statement focused on his support for Curley and Schultz rather than 
expressing true compassion for the victims (Wereschagin, 2012). He failed the “grace-under-
fire” test as the initial spokesperson for Penn State’s crisis response. 
 PSU’s statements were few and far-between in the initial crisis period, which came 
across as reactive silence and inaction rather than the transparent, proactive messaging that could 
have helped alleviate the public’s outcry at the crisis. The administrative changes they made 
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were key, but not immediate, so people perceived the reaction as slow and full of misplaced 
trust. As crisis management professional Terry Fahn stated, “although under normal 
circumstances, taking a week for a decision might be prudent, in Penn State’s case the silence 
was deafening” (2012). 
Penn State trustee Ron Tomalis, in an interview with Time Magazine, succinctly 
summarizes the board’s action timeline to fire Spanier and Paterno:  
“One of the misperceptions is about the slowness of the board to react to this situation 
after it broke. You have to remember that it was four days, 96 hours, from the time that 
that report was made public until Spanier and Paterno were both relieved of their 
responsibilities. Considering the size and scope of that institution, that's quite aggressive 
action in a short period of time” (Rotherham & Rawe, 2011). 
 
Tomalis makes a solid point, but it is still inexcusable that Penn State had no set plan of action in 
place to more smoothly communicate and transition the change in leadership. The climate of this 
entire situation inherently complicates it, as an administrative cover-up muddles the lines of 
‘who knows what’ and obviously creates opportunities for ethical sidesteps. But to think no one 
prepared for the possibility of this scandal one day coming to light is difficult to accept from a 
crisis communications best practice point-of-view. In terms of the board itself’s response over 
the course of this situation, press conferences sometimes featured more than five people 
speaking, including the then-chairwoman of the board, the governor of Pennsylvania, the PSU 
president and others (Progress, 2012). While splitting up the decision-making pressures among a 
diverse body of leaders is good administrative practice, perhaps by sticking to one spokesperson, 
Penn State could have put more of a face to its addressing of and moving forward from the 
Sandusky scandal. While President Erickson is an obvious choice as the figurehead for the 
university, Karen Peetz, the chairwoman of the board, showed eloquence and poise under media 
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fire and likely would have made a solid spokeswoman had she been given that sole 
responsibility. 
Public information began to trickle out over time, but the lack of two-way interaction 
from the start put a bad taste in the mouths of the public, and thus immediate reaction to the idea 
of Penn State’s PR efforts is generally negative. Perhaps it took until PSU hired Ketchum for 
$360,000 and hired multiple lawyers for help with legal and crisis communications consulting 
that the university was able to improve its efforts; still, that lack of crisis communication plan in 
place made for extreme chaos and further reputational damage than the initial crisis created 
(Wereschagin, 2012). The news of this crisis broke abruptly and almost immediately entered the 
“unfolding drama” stage, as details were not yet known and much uncertainty was prevalent for 
all involved. The “blame game” stage – usually reserved for later on in the crisis process – also 
began early, as people chose to point fingers at Paterno, Spanier, the university as a whole, the 
board and others instead of just at Sandusky. Finally, the fallout stage – which requires taking 
action – was poorly dealt with at first, as it took time for Penn State to react and take action. 
However, it is hard to say whether this was avoidable, as administrators themselves were so 
entangled in the scandal and personnel changes at the senior level are no trivial matter.   
Penn State’s primary way of responding to this crisis came in the form of press releases 
and news articles on its website. These statements released periodically from the time the news 
broke through the Freeh report’s release and beyond show relatively consistent messaging – as 
time went on, Penn State’s words showed more awareness and compassion to the victims while 
promising to take action and move forward. Still, a true and sincere apology was never 
expressed, and consistent messaging through press releases allowed for short, surface-level 
messaging. Perhaps by having a more interactive presence online or organizing open discussion 
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forums, Penn State could have rebuilt public trust sooner after the scandal. This lack of 
compassion mixed with an inherent lack of confidence, as the administration was involved with 
the scandal itself, showed a failure on Penn State’s part to engage with the “3 C’s.” Competence 
was in question from the start, and quickly became even more questionable at the dismissal of 
top administrators. The replacements Penn State chose proved to be competent with time, and 
communication became more compassionate as statements began incorporating lines directly 
recognizing Sandusky’s victims; confidence has come with time, but three years later, there is 
still a sense of extreme caution and need for extra compliance measures and ethics several years 
later.  
Stern Associates blogger and PSU alumna Ashley Glowinski believes the combination of 
a delayed response – due to Penn State’s initial silence and tight-lipped statement – along with 
former president Spanier’s “misdirected” statement placing extreme trust in his colleagues rather 
than focusing on the victims of Sandusky’s crimes contributed to Penn State’s worsening 
reputation crisis (Glowinski, 2012). Further, she believes the lack of immediate action on the part 
of Penn State to support child abuse prevention and treatment efforts showed a lack of support 
and clarity on behalf of university administrators (Glowinski, 2012). Still, I agree with Glowinski 
that Penn State’s eventual action to take down the Paterno statue and “gracefully [accept] the 
harsh penalties” from the NCAA showed progress, if delayed and long awaited at that 
(Glowinski, 2012). Essentially, Penn State was able to rebuild public trust and maintain its image 
as a well-respected institution and storied football program in spite of the scandal, but it did so 
over a more drawn-out timespan than it could have.   
PRSA blogger Rosanna Fiske hits the nail on the head, saying this crisis was not simply a 
PR issue, but a management and leadership issue (Fiske, 2011). Still, after the chain of failure 
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that occurred in the Penn State administration, the communications staff had an opportunity to 
bridge the gap between the institution and its publics, which they initially failed to do. Fiske 
agrees with media relations professional John R. Brooks in his assessment of Penn State’s 
actions; he insists that after authorities were contacted – which is obviously the first imperative 
step in dealing with the aftermath of actions that broke the law – Penn State owed the public a 
timely acknowledgement of the situation, including an apology to the victims and a direct 
address of the issue at hand: “It would not have changed the eventual outcome for the people 
involved, but it would have avoided the loud silence of official comment that seemed to exist” 
(Fiske, 2011).  
TCU government affairs professional Larry Lauer wrote in a blog post about the PSU 
crisis that unfolding athletics crises are often easy to criticize, but difficult to deal with at the 
time as details emerge and complicate (Lauer, 2011). He states that traditional crisis management 
techniques can be difficult to implement when communications professionals do not immediately 
know all the facts. This clearly played a role in the months between the Sandusky arrest and the 
Freeh report, which is perhaps why PSU stayed silent in a cautionary attempt to refrain from 
jumping to any conclusions. Lauer suggests that communications officials follow a crisis 
management plan as much as possible, but learn to deal with new facts as they come by 
clarifying message points and staying consistent across multiple media platforms, being clear, 
concise and transparent in telling the new stories (Lauer, 2011).   
A key turning point for Penn State was the decision to implement an independent 
investigation by outside counsel, which culminated in the Freeh Report. Former FBI director 
Louis Freeh was chosen to head the investigation and given “broad leeway to investigate anyone 
at the school, from department staffers to trustees themselves” (Matheson, 2012). Penn State – 
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specifically, the board of trustees’ established special committee – announced Freeh’s planned 
investigation and subsequent “impartial and comprehensive assessment” on November 21, 2011, 
several weeks after the scandal broke in the press (Progress, 2011). By choosing someone 
without affiliation to the university itself, PSU gained credibility and started to turn public 
opinion around regarding its handling of the Sandusky allegations. The board’s initiative to 
create a taskforce for an investigation and ultimately hire Freeh was a successful and much-
needed one; still, the time it took for these decisions to play out was what left Penn State in a 
bruised position in the public eye (Fahn, 2012). Even the administrative decisions to oust 
Paterno, Spanier and Schultz took time and were done in a less-than-graceful way, as Paterno 
ended up being fired by phone (Fahn, 2012).  
A crucial determinant in Penn State’s reaction to this crisis was the sheer lack of certainty 
and concrete understanding of the facts of the situation – Fahn argues that the lack of clarity 
surrounding the entire situation made it hard for Penn State officials to distinctly identify the 
“audiences and objectives it needed to target”: 
“Penn State’s approach to the Sandusky crisis was the antithesis of good crisis 
management. Instead of ascertaining and analyzing the facts of the situation before 
addressing the media, Penn State responded to media inquiries by offering its 
“unconditional support” to two individuals who were indicted for lying about the sexual 
abuse of minors. On top of this untenable position, because of their lack of knowledge 
about the facts of the matter, Penn State representatives were completely unable to clearly 
explain the circumstances surrounding the Grand Jury investigation” (Fahn, 2012). 
 
Fahn makes an excellent point regarding the misunderstanding – on the part of Penn State – not 
only of the facts, but also the level of media scrutiny that the Sandusky scandal would attract and 
the differing needs and opinions of its various publics: “…while Penn State attempted to address 
the demands of law enforcement and the media, it completely failed in its attempts to 
communicate with Penn State students, alumni, faculty and staff” (2012). Fahn points out the 
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messy firing of Joe Paterno – via telephone, late at night – as a classic example of Penn State’s 
missteps (2012). This move was a controversial one, and made in response to extensive public 
and media outcry; still, it angered many in the Penn State community, and its poorly (if at all) 
planned and purely “reactionary” execution resulted in “even more unneeded bad press” with 
students rioting in protest (Fahn, 2012).  
 If Penn State were to abide by the aforementioned “valued compass” in crafting its crisis 
response message dissemination, it would be forced to identify its various stakeholders, realize 
the aim it wants to take as an organization, determine standards to live up to and target 
stakeholder emotions accordingly. If Penn State chose to be honest, straightforward and 
respectful of the victims, crafting a response that was realistic, detailed and trustworthy, it could 
have aimed to immediately remedy fans’ anger, confusion and distrust.  
 In sum, Penn State’s initial reaction to the Sandusky crisis was slow and vague, and 
failed to properly focus itself on the victims, instead taking an internal focus. While the reaction 
improved over time with more frequent updates and some incorporation of videos, opportunities 
for increased media coverage and much-needed personnel and policy-changing decisions, Penn 
State missed out on the opportunity to use social media to its advantage in creating an interactive 
atmosphere in which it could communicate with the public, instead opting for silence on that 
front which came across as ignorance and further covering up efforts. The decision to hire Freeh 
and the steps taken to create an action plan post-Freeh Report showed savvy decision-making on 
the part of the PSU board of trustees, university and athletic department officials; these actions 
embraced truth, action, and managing for tomorrow – all key Page Principles. Its lack of prompt 
and effective crisis management strategy at the start of the crisis put Penn State in a poor position 
and left a bad taste in the mouths of the public. But as time progressed and it received expert 
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crisis advising, the institution was able to rebound from its initial missteps and begin rebuilding 
public trust. The “We Are” climate of Penn State – one of extreme loyalty and unfailing 
allegiance – was tested, but ultimately proved to bounce back. Penn State football was knocked 
down by this scandal, but not entirely out. 
PSU’S Current Pulse  
In 2013, Penn State, along with the other Big Ten schools, gave donations in the amount 
of what would have been its bowl revenues to several child-focused causes including the 
Children’s Advocacy Center (Progress, 2013). The Board of Trustees authorized PSU to arrange 
for legal settlements in the multiple suits against it by Sandusky’s victims – another move that 
recognized past wrongdoing and attempted to move forward toward amends and improvement 
while showing respect (Progress, 2013). Also in 2013, PSU named its first director of University 
ethics and compliance – a former FBI special agent – to oversee all compliance matters 
(Progress, 2013). In its continued carrying out of the Plan for Continuous Improvement, Penn 
State has shown considerable progress in administrative restructuring and governance.  
Since the time of the silent shadow in which Penn State social media platforms resided in 
late 2011 and early 2012, there has been an increased presence and seemingly more transparent 
effort to interact with fans. While there was still no mention of the scandal itself, the general feel 
of the football team’s Twitter and Facebook accounts is one that is open and up-to-date. The 
team also created an Instagram account prior to the 2013 season, which it updates regularly with 
images of the team on and off the field – many times interacting with fans and participating in 
community service outreach (Figure 5.1). Initiatives like the “It’s On Us” campaign to stop 
sexual assault continue to play a role in the Penn State football culture, with video spots played 
at football games and players’ participation being highlighted on Instagram (Figure 5.2). Further, 
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Penn State is not shying away from addressing its ugly scars as it has a research guide and 
librarian devoted to sharing information on the scandal, including news stories, legal 
information, student and faculty perspectives and university-issued statements. The overview on 
the Penn State Library website states:  
“The Sandusky sex abuse scandal has turned Penn State upside down and many students 
are struggling to make sense of recent events. 
This research guide is intended to assist students and other researchers investigating 
various aspects of the scandal for writing assignments or for their own edification. It is 
not intended to be comprehensive or be an endorsement for any one voice, but to be a 
springboard to find more information” (Penn State Sandusky Scandal Library Research 
Guide).  
 
While the repercussions of the Sandusky scandal will never truly disappear, they have certainly 
begun to fade. Just over three years since news of the scandal surfaced, the university continues 
to deal with sanctions and legal issues related to the terrible acts committed by its former 
employee. But to blame current leaders at the institution for the misguided actions of its past 
would be unfair – an idea that the public has begun to grasp now. Despite its early struggles to 
communicate in the face of scandal, which were directly related to its questionable 
administrative setup and lack of ethical guidance, PSU has made a considerable effort toward 
recovering from the effects of Jerry Sandusky.  
Penn State’s Progress website continues to be updated periodically even today, and the 
fruits of the initiatives set forth in response to the recommendations made in the Freeh Report are 
visible. Quarterly reports of the athletics integrity monitor, updated remarks from board meetings 
and additions to the Plan for Continuous Improvement are all viewable, along with many other 
resources for the public’s viewing and use (Progress, 2014). Penn State continues to play an 
active role in raising awareness and funds for victims of child sexual abuse, and its annual 
conferences shed light on the subject while maintaining its image as an aware and socially active 
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institution who is not running away from its past – though it has essentially moved on. President 
Erickson retired in May 2014 and was replaced by Eric J. Barron – former Florida State 
president – after completion of a national search. The PSU Board of Trustees recognized 
Erickson’s “meritorious service” as president with a medal of recognition and the naming of the 
Rodney A. Erickson Food Science Building (Progress, 2014). PSU athletic director Dave Joyner 
announced his retirement in July 2014; his replacement, former UC-Berkeley AD Sandy 
Barbour, was hired soon after. These administrators were recognized for their courageous efforts 
in the difficult era of post-2011 Penn State, and now the once-removed class of administration 
has taken on the responsibility to continue Penn State’s efforts to move forward. 
In terms of football, the Penn State team has seen success despite the distractions of 
administrative upheaval and media scrutiny resulting from the scandal. After finishing the 
scandal season 9-4 (with those wins vacated due to NCAA sanctions), the team finished 8-4 and 
7-5 under Bill O’Brien in 2012 and 2013, respectively. At the time of this thesis’ writing, PSU is 
5-4 and on the cusp of being bowl-eligible in 2014. Bill O’Brien’s leadership, and now James 
Franklin’s strong coaching style, have proven to be successful first steps in moving forward from 
the Paterno era.  
At the beginning of the fall 2014 football season, the NCAA announced that it would lift 
some of Penn State’s sanctions related to the Sandusky scandal due to “remarkable progress” 
shown by PSU over the course of the year (Moyer, 2014). While it still must pay the $60 million 
fine and 111 of Paterno’s wins will remain vacated, Penn State will be eligible for postseason 
bowl play starting in 2014 and will have all scholarships available starting in 2015 (Moyer, 
2014). This decision was met with mixed reaction from the public, as many felt it was a copout 
on the part of the NCAA, and still others felt the sanctions were too harsh to begin with since the 
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current team and administrators – the ones enduring the consequences of the penalties – are not 
the ones who committed the transgressions from which they resulted.  
Recommendations and Keys to Handling Future Crises in College Football  
Penn State’s football program endured an unprecedented crisis in the wake of the Jerry 
Sandusky scandal. Crises in college athletics are not uncommon, but one of this proportion was 
hard for anyone to imagine. By putting its change hat on and setting forth with new 
administration – on the team, in the athletic department and on a university-level as a whole – 
Penn State was able to move out of Sandusky and his colleagues’ shadows toward a new era and 
fresh start for Penn State, rather than sinking back to “normal” – whatever normal even was. The 
climate at Penn State is one so uniquely passionate and far-reaching that few college football 
programs could rival it in terms of fan loyalty and rabidity. If a crisis of this magnitude were to 
happen at a big-time, perhaps SEC school, it would be wise to use Penn State’s actions as a 
preliminary benchmark and basis from which to learn.  
Having a preemptive risk management and crisis communication plan – including a 
designated spokesperson – in place is paramount to overcoming the hiccups of an unfolding 
scandal as smoothly as possible (Tsikoudakis, 2012). While crises are sometimes inevitable, 
having a set policy to deal with potential misconduct and purchasing risk management insurance 
are ways that universities can be proactive and prepared for future problems (Tsikoudakis, 2012). 
Employing a full-time compliance staff is a major asset to these programs, and ensuring that the 
athletic compliance staff works with senior administration of the university itself is key. I agree 
with PSU Professor Michael Bérubé in his assessment of PSU’s administrative issues, as early 
on he recommended the creation of a faculty ethics committee for the administration to consult 
with in dealing with allegations and issues of a controversial nature, especially in athletics 
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(Bérubé, 2011). President Rodney Erickson’s initially promised “new era of transparency” and 
appointment of a direct report ethics officer was certainly a start; still, Bérubé argues that “it is 
entirely conceivable that when confronted by an issue with powerful repercussions for university 
business (whether with regard to athletics or to drilling for natural gas in the Marcellus Shale), an 
ethics officer will offer advice that tries to protect the university – and its leadership – from 
damaging public scrutiny” (Bérubé, 2011). Thus, by leaning on its faculty rather than continuing 
the tradition of the old boys’ club of a closed-loop administration, Penn State can garner trust 
among its own while creating a more beneficial relationship with outside stakeholders and the 
public. Penn State essentially did just this in its creation of a new ethics committee and its hiring 
of an ethics specialist and an athletics integrity officer (Progress, 2014).  
With the Sandusky abuse scandal in hindsight, it is clear that being proactive as managers 
and communicators could be the difference-maker in preventing and assuaging ethical scandals 
and crises. Universities, especially large ones entwined in big-time football culture, would 
benefit from using what Bérubé calls the principle of “shared governance” – essentially a system 
of checks and balances – by utilizing resources beyond the scope of the athletic department. 
Spreading the power among multiple departments would foster a culture of transparency and 
open communication channels, allowing issues to be addressed as they arise rather than swept 
under the rug by the few hands in control. 
In terms of social media, there is a delicate balance to be struck between being open, 
transparent and interactive and being overzealous and hasty with responses before they are truly 
thought through. Social media and crisis guru Melissa Agnes suggests addressing a situation 
immediately when it gets exposed; using real-time communication from the get-go fosters a 
sense of openness and honesty, allowing for a consistent flow of messages and garnering a sense 
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of appreciation from the public despite the difficult position the school – Penn State, in this case 
– is in (Agnes, 2012). She further suggests creating a social media crisis team of monitors and 
communicators to continually check the pulse of online discussions and allow for 24/7 
interactive communication to answer questions and respond to comments (Agnes, 2012). Finally, 
Agnes suggests developing a clear and consistent message – not simply staying silent – and 
communicating it coherently across all platforms, through a spokesperson and Penn State staff 
(Agnes, 2012). Even updating social media platforms with links and images tied directly to 
official statements and press conferences would be a way to maintain some control of the 
program’s message. While engaging in such open communication as Twitter chats might not be 
feasible in the unstable legal climate of a major crisis, keeping social media platforms alive and 
active from the moment the crisis emerges in the public eye is a way to begin building trust and 
showing transparency to the public.  
Karen Freberg, strategic communications professor at the University of Louisville, 
suggests that after acknowledging its plans to change the leadership culture and continuing to 
engage its publics in a transparent manner through social media platforms, Penn State could have 
“[taken] initiative to make serious changes in the athletic world to move forward,” perhaps by 
creating an alliance of schools or promoting a program for the NCAA to train staffers and create 
awareness of ethical issues in the collegiate athletics realm (Fiske, 2011).  
In a general sense, the ‘football as king’ mentality is clearly a dangerous one that allows for the 
growth of ignorance and blindness on college campuses. PSU professor Charles R. Garoian 
states that “the incontrovertible, passive acceptance of football, and its monopolization of 
presumed positivity at Penn State, created a furtive environment where the sexual abuses could 
occur” (2012). He further elaborates that the mere “fear of losing control and fear of losing 
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power constitute an admixture for corruption and calamity” (Garoian, 2012). This must be kept 
in the forefront of the minds of not only compliance officials, but athletic, academic and general 
administrators at universities around the country. Teams have the potential to unite campus 
communities in a passionate and exciting way, but allowing football to ‘drive the bus’ fosters a 
misdirected sense of prioritization that can lead to ethical sidesteps.  
 While fostering a set of strong and ethical values is easy to advise with the benefit of 
hindsight, ensuring that it becomes a reality can sometimes be difficult. By using a system such 
as the “value compass” mentioned before – as trivial as it may seem – a football program can 
identify its main principles and the standards it hopes to meet with its crisis communication 
efforts from the get-go. In a situation with victims where internal publics are to blame, one must 
be careful to respect and acknowledge the damage done before placing too much trust in any one 
entity – be it an individual or body of people. Further, in consciously targeting the emotions of 
its audiences, programs would be wise to consider training and preparing a single spokesperson 
– or perhaps two to three, depending on the magnitude of the scandal – to put forth a consistent 
and coherent message. When an administrative body such as a board of trustees is involved, a 
school runs the risk of members going rogue; plus, clashing egos could make for 
miscommunications and disagreements that may fail to present messages from a united front. 
The spokesperson is a major choice, but one that should be consciously and tentatively planned 
as part of the crisis communication strategy ahead of time. 
 Finally, despite the dangers and risks associated with the corruption of big-time college 
football programs, these programs must realize the benefit of the asset that is their fiercely loyal 
and supportive publics – including fans, students and alumni. Rallying these supporters early on 
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in the crisis response efforts could make the difference between short-term scrutiny and long-
term, widespread disdain.  
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Appendix  
The Value Compass 
 
Figure 1.1 This chart demonstrates how to fill out the value compass in determining a plan of 
action for addressing the media in times of crisis (Ansell & Leeson, 2010).  
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Figure 2.1 This statement was released in response to the Board’s 
decision to oust PSU President Graham Spanier. Spanier alludes to his 
innocence and attempts to set the stage for the Penn State community to 
move forward from the throes of crisis (Progress, 2011).  
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Figure 2.2 This statement was released to announce the replacement of 
Dr. Graham Spanier (president) and Coach Joe Paterno, a controversial 
decision but one for which many in the court of public opinion were 
calling (Progress, 2011).  
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Figure 2.3 This statement was released by new PSU President Rodney 
Erickson, acknowledging his role as interim president and calling upon 
the PSU community to follow his lead to move on while remaining 
aware of the importance of ethical and integral conduct  (Progress, 
2011).  
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Figure 2.4 This statement was released by new PSU President Rodney 
Erickson, setting forth his five promises as a plan of action in response 
to the Sandusky crisis (Progress, 2011).  
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Figure 3.1 This Facebook post from the Penn State Football page was essentially the only direct 
acknowledgement of anything involving the scandal. 
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Figure 3.2 This Facebook post from the Penn State page mentions part of the statement made by 
President Erickson regarding university recognition and memorial of Joe Paterno after his 
passing. Until this post, there was ultimately no mention of anyone or any part of the scandal on 
the page. 
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Figure 4.1 This AP photo shows Penn State and Ohio State players 
meeting on the field for a prayer for victims of child abuse in the wake of 
the Sandusky scandal (retrieved from 
http://www.chicagonow.com/legends-leaders-ledger/2011/11/penn-state-
tries-to-move-forward-badgers-in-control-michigan-state-is-on-a-boat/). 
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Figure 5.1 This is the first post from the Penn State Football 
Instagram page, made in spring 2013, shows a growing 
social media presence post-scandal. 
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Figure 5.2 This is another post from the Penn State Football 
Instagram page, updated frequently, which shows the 
football team’s participation in the “It’s On Us” campaign to 
stop sexual assault. 
